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ABSTRACT
Unattended ground sensors have a tremendous potential for improving Tactical
Ballistic Missile Attack Operations. To date, however, this potential has gone unrealized
primarily due to a lack of confidence in the systems and a lack of tactical doctrine for their
employment. This thesis provides analyses to demonstrate the effective use of sensor
technology and provides recommendations as to how it may best be employed.
The probabilistic decision model reports the optimal size array for each of the
candidate array locations. It also provides an optimal policy for determining the likelihood
that the target is a Time Critical Target based on the number of sensors in agreement as to
its identity. This policy may vary with each candidate array. Additionally,
recommendations are made on the placement ofthe arrays within the theater of operations
and their optimal configuration to maximize information gained while minimizing the
likelihood of compromise. Specifics include, inter-sensor spacing, placement patterns,
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AOR Area of Responsibility
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CPA Closest Point of Approach
kph Kilometers Per Hour
OOB Order of Battle
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SOF Special Operations Force
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGS Unattended Gound Sensor
TBM Theater Ballistic Missile
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense





Pd Single incident Bernoulli trial probability sensor detects a target within its
maximum range.
f\ Probability of identification by sensor,
/o Probability of mis-identification by sensor.
U Sensor sample rate (samples/ second),
v Vehicle velocity (kilometers per hour).
.Kmax Maximum sensor range (meters).
r Maximum effective sensor range corrected for off-road distance (meters).
ds Perpendicular off-road distance (meters).
dt Distance traveled between sensor samples (meters).
s Number of samples available per sensor,
/•{detect
| U) Probability sensor detects passing vehicle for given sample rate.
Pdetect Probability sensor detects passing vehicle given sensor technology (Pd,
^max, h) and operational considerations (v, d*).
Px Fraction of vehicles that are TCTs.
P{TCT| kin} Probability detected vehicle is a TCT given exactly k of n sensors in the
array indicate it is.
P{TCT| >kln} Probability detected vehicle is a TCT given at least k ofn sensors in the
array indicate it is.
P{TCT} Probability detected vehicle is TCT based on forecast by array.
N Number of sensors available to theater commander.
A Number of candidate array sites.
/' Index of a road to be seeded with an array.
Px(i) Fraction of traffic on road / comprised of TCTs.
A,, Vehicle flow rate on road / (vehicles per hour).
«,* Optimal array size for road /'.
/R Theater commander's maximum desired reporting time for entire array.
XV
Pc Probability one or more sensors are compromised, given one sensor is
found.
ki* Minimum number of sensors indicating vehicle is a TCT for the theater
commander to commit an attack asset.
/ Search time for hostile force (minutes).
m Number of searchers in hostile force.
S Searcher speed (m2/ second).
A s Area searched by m individuals each searching at speed S for t minutes
(m2).
Vici Transiting time critical target velocity (kph).
m>i Theater Commander's weight on reporting time.
w2 Theater Commander's weight on compromise.
w3 Theater Commander's weight on countermeasures.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Unattended ground sensors have a tremendous potential for improving Tactical
Ballistic Missile Attack Operations. To date, however, this potential has gone unrealized
primarily due to a lack of confidence in the systems and a lack of tactical doctrine for their
employment. This thesis provides analyses to persuade decision makers to trust sensor
technology and provides recommendations as to how they may best be employed.
A Time Critical Target (TCT) is any military vehicle which, from its standard
tactics, can be expected to remain on the road system for a period not to exceed 30
minutes. As a result of this, actions taken to prosecute this type of target must be made
expeditiously. TCT's include more than just Transporter-erector Launcher (TEL) units.
They may also be command vehicles, missile fuel trucks, missile loading trailers, and
mobile SAM units, among others.
Theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense basically follows two discrete doctrines.
Counterforce is the destruction of a TCT as it travels to and from its assembly area for
reloading and maintenance. Active defense is the destruction of the individual tactical
ballistic missile after launch during the boost, reentry or terminal phases. Only the
counterforce defense strikes the target while it is slow-moving and, more importantly,
only counter force prevents future use of the same TCT.
In the pre-hostility phase of a conflict, it will become necessary to locate and
monitor TBM vehicles to prepare an adequate counter-attack should the conflict escalate.
In addition to national collection assets, unattended ground sensors, placed strategically
along known or suspected TCT travel routes, would aid in the development of a clear
tactical picture to meet this end.
Should hostilities escalate to the point where armed response is required, a prime
concern of the theater commander in the early phase of the conflict is the enemy TBM
threat. It is in this early phase that the enemy has the greatest chance of surprise, and the
full strength of its TBM force. TCT routes confirmed in the pre-hostility phase by ground
sensors can now be covered by combat air patrol (CAP) or lethal unmanned aerial vehicles
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(UAV) awaiting a targeting order. Should a sensor array indicate the presence of a TCT,
the decision maker can order the prosecution of that target by assets already on station.
The analyses provided in this document emphasize the use of unattended ground
sensors in the locating and positive identification of time critical targets. Some degree of
friendly intelligence capability is assumed in that candidate sensor array sites are chosen
within the theater, and realistic enemy TCT populations are used. With the arrays in
place, the decision maker must be able to evaluate the output of the array to determine,
with some degree of confidence, if the target before the array is a TCT or a false
indication.
The probabilistic decision model is based on there being a finite number of sensors
available in a specific theater, with a fixed number of pre-determined candidate array sites.
Further inputs include the approximate fraction of vehicle traffic assumed to be TCT on
each road to be seeded. This assumption is based on the belief that the intelligence
analysts have pre-determined the most likely areas for TBM activity.
From the above input data, the model reports the optimal size array for each of the
candidate locations. Additionally, the decision maker is provided with an optimal policy
for determining the likelihood that the target is a TCT based on the number of sensors in
agreement as to its identity. This policy may vary with each candidate array.
Finally, recommendations are provided on the placement of the arrays and their
best configuration to maximize information gained while minimizing the likelihood of
compromise. Specifics include, inter-sensor spacing, placement patterns, array locations,
and off-road distance.
Theater ballistic missiles are a significant threat to any theater commander in the
battlefields of the future. It is only through the optimal use of all available sensors that
decisive action may be taken against these time critical targets. Unattended ground
sensors, when properly deployed, provide an inexpensive reliable option to monitor the
battlespace before, during and after the conflict.
xvni
I. INTRODUCTION
Unattended ground sensors have a tremendous potential for improving Tactical
Ballistic Missile Attack Operations. To date, however, this potential has gone unrealized
primarily due to a lack of confidence in the systems and a lack of tactical doctrine for their
employment. This thesis provides analyses to demonstrate the effective use of sensor
technology and provides recommendations as to how it may best be employed. The
relatively disappointing show of active defense systems, such as Patriot, has illustrated the
need for a more reliable, yet cost-effective means of defending theater forces. Further, it
has been shown that forces must be successful in attack operations, without which active
defense will never be enough.
Since the 1960's, ground sensors have been used to sharpen the theater tactical
picture with limited effect. An early attempt, the McNamara Line of 1967, was aimed at
slowing the flow of military goods along the Ho Chi Minn Trail by identifying targets for
air strikes. These were arcane acoustic and seismic detectors with relaying aircraft, both
manned and remotely piloted, used to monitor the output. The normal time between
target acquisition and weapon delivery was approximately five minutes, yet few kills were
confirmed[Ref 1]. These poor results have been attributed to the unreliable and limited
output of the sensors. Specifically, the sensors of the McNamara Line could determine if
a target was personnel, wheeled vehicle, or tracked vehicle. For the United States, the
losses fighting the sensor war were significant. Of the more than 600 planes and
helicopters lost in Laos, one half to two-thirds were lost to defensive positions along the
Ho Chi Minn Trail [Ref. 1]. Today's mission is similar, but the sensors have improved
tenfold. The key, however, remains detecting and identifying a viable military target
against which minimal assets are directed.
A Time Critical Target (TCT) is any military vehicle which, from its standard
tactics, can be expected to remain on a road system for a period not to exceed 30 minutes.
As a result, actions taken to prosecute this type of target must be made expeditiously.
TCTs include Transporter-erector Launcher (TEL) units, command vehicles, missile fuel
trucks, missile loading trailers, and mobile SAM units, among others. During the Gulf
War American pilots used random search tactics in an attempt to locate Iraqi TELs. Not
only did this tactic prove largely unsuccessful, but it required the coalition to completely
control the airspace above the battlefield. A more prudent tactic would be to send friendly
aircraft over hostile territory only to prosecute a specific target already detected, located
and identified by electronic means.
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense basically follows two discrete doctrines.
Counterforce is aimed at the destruction of a TCT as it travels to and from its assembly
area for reloading and maintenance. Active defense is aimed at the destruction of the
individual tactical ballistic missile after launch during the boost, reentry or terminal
phases. Only the counterforce strikes the target while it is slow-moving and, more
importantly, only counterforce prevents future use of the same TCT and its crew. It has
been shown that counterforce, even in modest proportions, geometrically reduces the
incoming tactical ballistic missile threat [Ref. 2].
In the pre-hostility phase of a conflict, it will become necessary to locate and
monitor TBM vehicles to prepare an adequate counter-attack should the conflict escalate.
In addition to national collection assets, unattended ground sensors, placed strategically
along known or suspected TCT travel routes, would aid in the development of a clear
tactical picture to meet this end. Special Operations forces are also ideally suited for this
type of work, but they constitute a limited and valuable commodity. Laying the sensor
arrays, however, would definitely be a part of the pre-conflict Special Operations
repertoire.
Should hostilities escalate to the point where armed response is required, a prime
concern of the theater commander in the early phase of the conflict is the enemy TBM
threat. It is in this early phase that the enemy has the greatest chance of surprise, and the
full strength of its TBM force. TCT routes confirmed in the pre-hostility phase by ground
sensors can now be covered by combat air patrol (CAP) or lethal unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) awaiting a targeting order. Should a sensor array indicate the presence of a TCT,
the theater commander can order the prosecution of that target by assets already on
station. Turnaround times would be similar to those of the McNamara Line, but only
against mission essential targets. Additionally, unlike the Gulf War, aircraft would be used
for strike only, not for search. This would free additional sorties for the CAP missions.
There is also a political advantage to preparing a battlefield with unattended
ground sensors. Through CNN America saw technology and training win a nearly
bloodless battle in the GulfWar. Continuing this trend will require the reduction in the
number of humans on the battlefield. Simply put,
There would be far less anger directed against an encounter in which the United
States was putting hardware, not men, on the line and one which American
casualty lists were dominated by decimated sensors, burnt-out computers, and
downed RPVs [Ref. 3]
America's growing need for instant access to newsworthy information and demand for
quickly resolved conflicts will require commanders to keep theater conflicts short and
neat. It may be neither feasible nor desirable to await the final breakdown of negotiations
before pinpointing enemy TBM forces. The use of unattended ground sensors could aid in
defining hostile depots, staging areas, and hide sites prior to hostilities.
B. ANALYSES
The analyses provided in this document emphasize the use of unattended ground
sensors in the locating and positive identification of time critical targets. Some degree of
friendly intelligence capability is assumed in that candidate sensor array sites are chosen
within the theater, and realistic enemy TCT populations are used. With the arrays in
place, the decision maker must be able to evaluate the output of the array to determine,
with some degree of confidence, if the target before the array is a TCT or a false
indication.
The probabilistic decision model is developed and described in Chapter II. It is
based on there being a finite number of sensors available in a specific theater, with a fixed
number of pre-determined candidate array sites. Further inputs include the approximate
fraction of vehicle traffic assumed to be TCTs on each road to be seeded. This
assumption is based on the belief that the intelligence analysts have pre-determined the
most likely areas for TBM activity.
From the above input data, the model reports the optimal array size for each of the
candidate locations. Additionally, the decision maker is provided with an optimal policy
for determining the likelihood that the target is a TCT based on the number of sensors in
agreement as to its identity. This policy may vary with each candidate array.
In Chapter III, recommendations are provided on the placement of the arrays and
their best configuration to maximize information gained while minimizing the likelihood of
compromise. Specifics addressed include, inter-sensor spacing, placement patterns, array
locations, and off-road distance.
Chapter IV contains an analysis of the optimal location for the sensor array, along
a given road. Considerations include locating at road intersections, along roads away
from intersections, and at choke points through which roads pass.
Finally, Chapter V contains conclusions on all the analyses performed and provides
a step-by-step procedure for defining, locating, and utilizing sensor arrays in a theater of
operations.
II. MODELS AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In the quest to determine the optimal sensor deployment scheme, it is most
important to choose a model representative of actual Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
(TBMD) operations. After some important clarifications, this chapter introduces the two
separate models used in this thesis.
First it is necessary to introduce the reader to the terminology common to TBM
operations. Next, the reader will learn why the probability of detection can be assumed
equal to one for an array of one or more sensors, and how this differs from the probability
of correct identification. After introducing the equations which drive the numerical
analysis of the probability of identification, the reader will find a description of the
measures of effectiveness used to analyze the optimal policy. Finally, the assumptions
common to both models are discussed to prepare the reader for the models, whose
introductions end the chapter.
An analysis of this complexity requires well defined notation. The reader will find
definitions for all notation used, in order of appearance, given in the List of Symbols on
page xv.
B. TERMINOLOGY
Before proceeding, it is necessary to specify the terminology to be used
throughout this document. Additional guidance in decoding the numerous acronyms used
is provided in the List of Abbreviations on page xiii.
1. Time Critical Target
A Time Critical Target (TCT) is any military vehicle which, from its standard
tactics, can be expected to remain on the road system for a period not to exceed 30
minutes. As a result of this, actions taken to prosecute this type of target must be made
expeditiously. TCTs include more than just Transporter-erector Launcher (TEL) units.
They may also be command vehicles, missile fuel trucks, missile loading trailers, and
mobile Surface to Air Missile (SAM) units, among others.
2. "Steel Rattler" Unattended Ground Sensor
The "Steel Rattler" is a multi-component unattended ground sensor system with
seismic, acoustic and infrared detection and identification capabilities designed and tested
by Sandia National Laboratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The seismic/acoustic
system first detects a target of interest and attempts to match its signature with a pre-
loaded signature database. The time of detection, system position, and identification are
sent via satellite link to a decision maker in the fusion center. If a positive identification is
not possible, the seismic and acoustic systems "wake up" the infrared sensor which is
positioned further along the expected route of travel. The infrared sensor transmits to the
fusion center a still-photographic thermal image of the target of interest at its closest point
of approach. From this image, a system operator identifies the target. If the seismic and
acoustic systems make an identification, the infrared sensor remains dormant. Current
units are designed to be hand placed; air deployable units are undergoing testing. Air
deployable units will not have infrared sensors. The analysis in this thesis is based on the
assumption that all sensors are identical "Steel Rattlers." More information about this
sensor may be found in Appendix A.
3. Sensor Array
An array consists of one or more unattended ground sensors operating as a single
entity. That is not to say that their information is shared. Each sensor operates
independently, but the information returned from the sensors in the array is treated as a
single set of data.
4. Expected Loss
To measure properly the effects of varying array characteristics, it is necessary to
derive a utility function defining the relative value of all possible outcomes. Typically, one
of the payoff values is set equal to one, and the other outcomes are specified in relative
terms. For the purpose of this analysis, a leaker is given a value of two and afalse alarm
a value of one. That is, it is considered twice as detrimental to miss a TCT than it is to
prosecute an innocent vehicle. The appendices include analyses for other relative values
of leakers and false alarms.
5. Probability of Detection
The probability of detection, Pd , is the single incident Bernoulli trial probability of
success associated with the likelihood that the sensor identifies the presence of a target
within its detection range. It is important to note that a single sensor may have more than
one opportunity to detect the presence of a target, depending on the target's speed and the
sensor sample rate. This phenomenon is covered in greater detail later in this chapter.
6. Sensor Forecasts
In reality, the output of any sensor is a forecast. With this in mind, it is easy to see
that the probability of identification,/!, is the probability that the sensor correctly identifies
the target in front of it as a TCT given that it is a TCT. Similarly, the probability of false-
identification, /o, is the probability that the sensor incorrectly identifies the target before it
as a TCT when, in fact, it is not. These are values typically specified by the manufacturer
of the sensor after operational testing [Ref 4]
C. PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
Modern acoustic, seismic and magnetic sensors sample at a fixed rate of
/
s samples
per second. The significance of this rate is that a TCT moving along a road may be
investigated several times by the same sensor, thereby increasing the overall probability of
detection. In fact, it can be shown that a "Steel Rattler" type of unattended ground sensor
has a probability of detection approaching one against vehicles moving along roads at
reasonable speeds.
To illustrate this effect, assume a single vehicle is traveling down a road with
velocity v kph. Positioned along the road is an array ofn = 1 sensor with maximum range
Rr^x meters and sample rate /s samples per second. The maximum effective range is
determined by geometry to be r, and the sensor is positioned ds meters perpendicular to
the road, as shown in Figure 2.1, where ds < R^*.
v—>






Figure 2.1 - Single Sensor Probability of Detection
From the figure above, it is evident that the vehicle will travel through 2r meters of sensor
coverage for this particular sensor. Further, moving at speed v, the vehicle will travel
10 v
d, =-—— meters between sensor samples.
36 /,
Rearranging the above to solve for the number of samples available per sensor yields
2r 36 2rt
s




Therefore, as a function of the off-road distance, ds , the number of samples available per
sensor is given by
40= 7 -2^V*L-< (2.1).
Note the use of the floor function to allow only integer values of s(dj.
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between number of samples and off-road
distance for a sensor with sampling rate /s = 0.2 samples per second, and maximum range
^max ~ 500 meters, against a target moving at v = 15 kph.
Samples Available vs. Off-Road Distance
v = 15 kph, t s - 0.2 s/sec, R max = 500 m
Off-road Distance (m)
Figure 2.2 - Samples as Function of Off-road Distance
If the probability of detection for a single sensor sample is P^ then the probability
a vehicle is not detected on a single sample is (1 - Pa). For a sensor sampling at rate ta let
P{ detect
| 4} be the probability that it detects the passing vehicle. If the sensor is shown
as located in Figure 2.1, then assuming independence,
/>{detect|f,} = l-(l-/>d )\ (2.2)
where s is given by Equation (2. 1). Values ofPjdetect | 4} are shown in Table 2. 1 for a
sample size 5=10 with probabilities of detection ranging from 0. 1 to 0.9. It is clear that
even at a distance near the maximum sensor range, the overall probability of detection is
high, even for low values of Pa-
Table 2.1 - Sensor P{detect | ts}
for Sensor with Varying Pd










Typically, TCTs do not travel at speeds greater than v = 60 kph. A graph
illustrating the number of samples per sensor as a function of off-road distance and target










Number of Samples as Function of
Off-road Distance and Target Speed










Figure 2.3 - Samples vs. Off-road Distance vs. Speed
The curve drops to zero at an off-road distance equal to the sensor's maximum range for
obvious reasons. Clearly, in most cases there are more than enough samples for a single
sensor to warrant the assumption that any target present is always detected. The
exception is for extremely poor sensors, placed near the maximum range from the road
against high-speed targets. But, since this analysis concentrates on the "Steel Rattler"
type of sensor, this case does not apply.
Combining Equations (2.1) and (2.2) results in an expression for the probability of
detection for a given sensor which accounts for several aspects of the problem. Sensor
technology is represented by Pi, Rmax and ts . On the other hand, the operational
characteristics of vehicle speed and off-road sensor distance are given by v and ds.
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are combined to yield
detect = l-(l"^) L
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Detection probability versus off-road spacing is plotted for several values ofPd in
Figure 2.4. In every case the Pdetect drops to zero at ds = Pmax , as this reduces the effective













P detect vs. Off-road Distance
v - 10 kph, t s = 0.2 s/sec, R max - 500 m
"^

















Figure 2.4 - Pdetect as Function of Off-road Distance
Figure 2.5 provides an alternate way of analyzing this relationship. It shows the
maximum allowable off-road distance, ds , such that the probability of detection is at least
0.95, as a function of the single sample probability of detection, P^.
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Maximum Off-road Distance vs. P d
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Figure 2.5 - Maximum Off-road Distance vs. Pd
The sensors illustrated in these examples pale in comparison to the "Steel Rattler"
type of sensor, yet still produce exceptional probabilities of detection. The "Steel Rattler"
is advertised to have a sample rate, /s = 0.2 samples per second and a probability of
detection, Pd = 0.95 [Ref. 5]. These values make the probability of target detection
virtually one through its entire range. Hereafter, because of the sensor's sample rate and
maximum range, a vehicle is assumed to be detected with probability one.
D. PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION
In the previous section, the analysis of sensor detection indicates that a single
sensor has nearly certain probability of detecting a vehicle moving along a road at a
reasonable speed. The difficulty for the theater commander lies in determining when to
commit scarce attack assets to prosecute a vehicle identified as a TCT based on data
provided exclusively by ground sensors. The following discussion again assumes an array
is comprised of n "Steel Rattler" type sensors, each of which relays a vehicle identification
only once, at the closest point of approach, as it passes through the sensor's range. This
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identification is based on matching acoustic characteristics with an on-board signature file
loaded prior to sensor deployment.
For each sensor in an array of size n, recall from Chapter II, Section B, Definition
6 that
/i = P{ Sensor indicates a TCT, given a TCT is present}, and
/o = P{ Sensor indicates a TCT, given no TCT is present}.
Throughout the thesis it is assumed that the sensor can discriminate between TCTs and
other vehicles, so/i >/o. Let Px be the probability that an arbitrarily chosen vehicle
traveling the road is a TCT (i.e. Px is the fraction of vehicles that are TCTs).
The general formulation of probability of identification can be derived from Bayes'
Rule and the Law of Total Probability. In the decision model described in Chapter III, the
possible decision alternatives are to take action against a vehicle identified as a TCT, or
take no action. The decision to take action is made when the theater commander has
observed the number of sensors out of the entire array that indicate a TCT is present.
Thus, the required identification probability to be used in the objective(Loss) function is
P{TCT | kin), the probability that the detected vehicle is a TCT, given that exactly k out
ofn sensors in the array indicate it is. Assuming that the outputs of the array sensors are







V 7, ' r • (2.3)
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To demonstrate the use ofEquation (2.3), suppose there is an array ofn = 3
sensors along a road with a TCT population ofPx = 0.25. The sensors are identical with
/] = 0.80 and/o = 0.15. Table 2.2 shows the probability that a detected target is a TCT
given k of n sensors indicate that it is for various values of £.







The interested reader may turn to Appendix E for a more depth discussion of the
derivation of Equation (2.3).
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The theater commander must weigh all possible outcomes to arrive at his optimal
policy. It is clear that this necessitates a common measure of effectiveness (MOE) used
throughout the analyses. Possible candidate MOE's include the probability of an array
correctly identifying a target and the loss incurred by acting incorrectly based on an array
forecast. The former is maximized and the latter minimized.
Both of the above MOE's are used in this thesis because they are intertwined. The
best array size is achieved by optimizing the probability of correct identification subject to
constraints on the number of sensors, available intelligence, and potential array sites.
Given the optimal size, the incurred loss MOE is used to determine the theater
commander's decision policy. This relationship is made clear in Chapter III.
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F. COMMON MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
Before the models for optimal sensor deployment are introduced, it is necessary to
make some assumptions about the environment in which the problem is to be solved. The
following assumptions hold true for both models used in the analysis of sensor
configuration. First, there must be a finite number of sensors available to a theater
commander for his area of responsibility. The employment of these sensors, however, is
left to his discretion. If reality indicates that sensors are abundant, then the above
constraint can be thought of as a logistical limit to the maximum number in theater at a
given time. Next, it is imperative that the intelligence community be able to evaluate or
estimate the fraction of vehicles in the area of responsibility believed to be TCTs. This
assumption varies slightly between the two models, as shown in the following section. It
is not imperative that the intelligence specialists give an exact percentage. Because the
optimization is performed through a sensitivity analysis, an approximate range is sufficient
and can be calculated from the enemy order of battle (OOB). Finally, as Model 2 will
show, the optimization is best performed with a specific theater in mind. In this case, the
number of arrays desired is an input value, and would not make sense otherwise. These
simple assumptions set the stage for the two decision models below.
1. Model 1 Introduction
The first model is representative of the current, automatic "decision making" in
which one good decision is assumed to be the answer to all problems. It is included in this
thesis as a comparison to Model 2, which provides a response that changes with the
specific theater, and is recommended. With the common assumptions above, the theater
commander must choose n, the number of sensors in each array. LetN be the number of
sensors available and let A be the number of candidate array sites. Then, An < N. The
value of/? may come from some tactical publication, a rule of thumb, or a hunch. In Model
1, n is chosen mathematically by dividing the number of sensors available by the number of
,. ,
N
array sites, and rounding down to the next lowest integer. Thus, n — —
\_A
the arrays are of equal size, the optimal solution may be found directly by arithmetic
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. Since all of
or special operations communities. In this case, the value n = may not represent the
means. A significant drawback of this method is that sensors for additional arrays may not
be available later in the conflict. Summarizing, in Model 1 the problem is to specify
locations in the theater commander's AOR at which arrays should be placed. Array size is
the direct result of distributing the available sensors equally among the locations.
2. Model 2 Introduction
The second model presents a more pragmatic, yet flexible approach to the sensor
array problem. It uses the power of information gathered by intelligence analysts on the
best candidate array sites for a given theater. In addition to a fixed N, it is assumed that a
reasonable number of prospective sites has been chosen by professionals in the intelligence
N_
A_
optimal array size for a given location. In fact, roads with differing fractions ofTCT
traffic are expected to be best covered by arrays of differing size. Since the array positions
are chosen in advance, it is further assumed that some estimate ofTCT traffic can be made
for each road to be seeded. Let /' be one of the roads to be seeded with an array. Further,
let Px(i) be the fraction of traffic along road / comprised of TCTs. Then there is a specific
n,* corresponding to each Px(i). For each of these A arrays there will be an optimal policy
which dictates when the theater commander should commit an attack asset to a target.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the general problem flow and the solutions obtained. Chapter
II introduced material above the dashed line, including model inputs and primary outputs
of n,* and k,*. Inputs include the maximum number of sensors available, N
,
the number
of candidate array sites, A, and the estimated TCT fraction of the population, Px(i).
Chapter III demonstrates solutions to the problems displayed below the dashed line. A
brief sojourn above the line gives definitive solutions for the n,* and kt* introduced in this
chapter. Next, using the theater commander's maximum desired reporting time for the
entire array, /r, an inter-sensor spacing is determined, d. As an aside, these values may be
combined to evaluate Pc , the probability that the entire array is compromised given a
single sensor is found. With the array size, policy and spacing found, the theater
commander must now weight the array attributes of reporting, compromise, and
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countermeasures in accordance with his own view of the tactical situation. From these
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For reasons both tactical and financial, much emphasis is placed on the efficiency
and reliability of the information reported by the ground sensors. With a finite number of
sensors available, it is imperative that the arrays be configured so as to produce the most
reliable forecast to the theater commander at the minimum unit cost.
Before continuing, it is necessary to introduce the problem to be solved by the
models. In some specific theater, there is a network of roads along which time critical
traffic, as well as normal civilian traffic, is known to travel. The fraction of vehicular
traffic that is TCT is Px , and the fraction along a specific road / of interest is Px(i),
i = 1,2,. . .,A. Further, the theater commander has been allocated JV unattended ground
sensors to locate and identify the TCT traffic, to be deployed at his discretion. Let these
sensors have performance characteristics of/i = 0.80 and/o = 0.15, as described
previously. Further, it is assumed that hostilities have erupted, so the "cost" of mis-
identifying an actual TCT is r x = 2 and the "cost" of a false alarm is r2 = 1 . That is, a
leaker is twice as costly as a false alarm. . Using this model, the following discussion
details methods for determining the optimal array size, spacing and deployment pattern for
the two models specified in Chapter II, Section F.
B. ARRAY SIZE AND OPERATING POLICY
1. Model 1
The array size in Model 1 is the same for all locations and is predetermined to be n.
This n is simply a function of the number of candidate array sites, A, and is given by
A
sensitivity analysis consists of finding the optimal policy as a function ofthe overall TCT
population in the theater. Let k< be the minimum number of sensors indicating a vehicle is




whereN is the number of sensors available. With the array size fixed, the
kt or more ofn policy defined in the previous chapter, Section D, may be found by solving
the nonlinear program for each road, /:










where /,{«, k,) is the expected loss function derived in Appendix F, and shown below as
n
Equation (3.1). The binomial distribution function given by V f J (l - f Y J is
abbreviated as #(#,., «,/ ).
l^k^r^k.-XnJ^iD+r^l-^ -l,«,/ )](l-Px (/)). (3.1)
Optimum k,* values for varying Px and array sizes, n, are shown in Table 3.1 for arrays up
to size «= 10.
Table 3.1 - Optimum Model 1 Policies
p, n=l n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7 n=8 n=9 n=10
0.10 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6
0.20 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5
0.30 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
0.40 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
0.50 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
0.60 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
0.70 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
0.80 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4
0.90 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4 |
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For example, if the theater commander is allotted N = 12 UGS for his AOR
consisting ofA = 3 array sites, then he will deploy three arrays of size n = 4. His
intelligence team estimates the fraction of vehicles which are TCT's on the three roads are
Px(l) = 0.30, Px(2) = 0. 10 and Px(3) = 0.20. Therefore, he knows from Table 3.1 that he
should prosecute the target only ifk\* - 2, fc2* = 3 and £3 * = 3 or more of the three
sensors in a given array identify the target as a TCT. These results are summarized in
Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 - Model 1 Example Results
Array PAi) n fc*
I 0.30 4 2
n 0.10 4 3
m 0.20 4 3
The commander knows that this policy will minimize losses due to leakers and false
alarms, thereby optimizing his asset allocation.
2. Model 2
Array size is the essence of the problem for Model 2. Remember that each array
potentially has a different number of sensors based on the fraction of TCT's on the
specified road, Px(i). Let n, be the number of sensors used at location i, and let X* be the
traffic flow rate along road i measured in vehicles per hour. In this case, the only
restrictions on the n, are that they be integers, that X w, - N > and that each prospective




















l) = r,B{kl -l,Wi J^PSO+r^X-^ -lAtf )](l-Px (f)) . (3.2)
For example, assume the same theater commander is again allottedN = 12 UGS
for his AOR, which has A = 3 candidate array sites. His intelligence team estimates the
fraction of vehicles which are TCT's on these three roads are Px(l) = 0.30, Px(2) = 0. 10
and Px(3) = 0.20. Additionally, the flow rates for these roads are estimated at X, = 1
vehicle per hour, for all i. After solving the nonlinear integer program outlined above, the
optimal array sizes are «i* = 3, n2 * = 4 and «3* = 5. The optimal £,*, given these n,* are
k\* = 2, k2* = 3 and fa* =3. These results are summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 - Model 2 Example Results
Array P*(i) «, */
I 0.30 3 2
11 0.10 4 3
m 0.20 5 3
Again, the commander knows that losses due to leakers and false alarms will be minimized
if the kt* or more of «,* policy indicated is adhered to for a particular array. Given that
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k* or more do indicate a TCT, he should prosecute the target, now identified as a TCT,
with an available asset.
A comparison of the results reveals the advantages of Model 2 over Model 1.
Continuing with the assumption that the same three roads were seeded in the given theater
of operations gives the results summarized in Table 3.4. Model 1 determines a k\* = 2,
k2* = 3 and k3 * = 3 or more ofn = 4 policy, and Model 2 determines the policies
summarized in Table 3.3. In both cases the corresponding road populations, Px(i), are
used for the loss function.
Table 3.4 - Model Comparison Summary
Expected Loss on Road
1 2 3 Total
Model 1 0.0930 0.0469 0.0819 0.2218
Model 2 0.1049 0.0469 0.0445 0.1963
Clearly, even for this small example, Model 2 shows superior performance at a cost of
twelve sensors for the theater. As the number of candidate sites and sensors increases, so
do the savings in manpower for deployment, and sensor equipment.
C. ARRAY SPACING
With the array size and identification policy determined, the next logical question
to answer is how far apart should the sensors of a particular array be spaced, and how far
from the road should they be. The second half of the question is more subjective, and
therefore will be addressed first. In the case of air dropped sensors, it is likely that
considerable error will be associated with the deployment and free-fall of the individual
units. In this case, it seems smartest to aim at a position half of the maximum radius away
from the road. Location error in either direction will then still allow the sensor to function
with some or all of its capability. Sensors placed by special operations units are positioned
with a greater degree of accuracy, and will always be within the range of the sensor's
capabilities. Therefore, the off-road distance of the sensor should be left to the discretion
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of the insertion team leader, who should receive some training in placement. In general,
the distance should be as close to the road as is operationally possible, without risking
compromise of the sensor or the insertion team.
Inter-sensor spacing is a function of several different factors. Generally, the
sensors need to be close enough to each other that the theater commander can consider
the report cycle of all sensors in an array as a single event. On the other hand, they should
be spaced far enough apart to minimize the likelihood that the entire array is compromised
should a single sensor be discovered. Clearly, the probability that the entire array is
compromised increases with decreasing inter-sensor distance. The goal is to find a middle
ground acceptable to the theater commander.
To analyze this relationship, assume the hostile force has found a sensor and will
conduct a random search of the surrounding area for some time, /, minutes. Then,
assuming that m individuals each search randomly and uniformly at a rate ofS m2/second,
these individuals cover a total area ofA s = Smt m
2
during the search time. Using a
standard area search model, the area to be searched is actually a circle with a radius equal
to the distance between the farthest two sensors. This data is obtained by the enemy
observing American standard operating procedures during the conflict, and correctly
estimating n. An upper bound on this radius is found by assuming the sensors are arrayed
in the line pattern configuration and that the sensor initially found is at the end of the line.
This value is easily seen to be radius = d{n-\). Let Pc be the probability an additional array
sensor is compromised, given that a single sensor has been found. Then, from Random






This probability of compromise, Pc , is shown on the left hand curve in Figure 3.1 for
varying inter-sensor range, d. Other parameters used in this illustration are:
• « = 4 sensors
• S = 24 m2/ second
• m = 4 searchers
• t = 240 minutes
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For example, if four sensors are spaced at an inter-sensor distance ofd= 300
meters, and the search effort is as indicated as above, then the probability that one
additional sensor is discovered in the allotted search time is:
60-24-4-240
P
c (300) = l-e




Therefore, there is a 41.9% chance that the searching party will find one additional sensor
in t = 240 minutes.
At the same time, the theater commander is awaiting the full report of his array.
This time increases linearly with increasing inter-sensor distance, d, and is shown as the
straight line in Figure 3.1. This figure assumes that the TCT is traveling at a constant
speed, Vjct = 20 kph.
P
c and Report Time vs. Inter-sensor Range
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Figure 3.1 - Effect of Inter-sensor Range on Pc and Report Time
The graph illustrates two distinct features. The left hand curve depicts the decreasing
probability that the search team compromises an additional sensor in the allotted time as
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the sensors become spaced further apart. The linear curve shows the increase in reporting
time for the entire array as this inter-sensor distance increases. These two relations may be
combined to obtain the probability of compromising one or more additional sensors as a
function of array reporting time, given as Equation (3.3). It is important to remember that









where fo is the reporting time for the entire array. A plot ofPc for varying tR is shown in
Figure 3.2 for the parameters specified above.
P c vs. Reporting Speed
00 00 o\ o\
Report Time (min)
Figure 3.2 - Pc as Function of Reporting Speed
It is important to remember that most of the factors involved in this curve are
beyond the control of the theater commander. Placement errors from air drops or hand
emplacement can influence the inter-sensor distance, and the opposing search team's
capabilities, size, and available time are unknowns. These formulae above simply serve as
a general reference as to the overall mission capability of the system using estimated
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parameters. Table 3.5 gives the inter-sensor range, d, for varying array sizes, n, and
maximum reporting times, tR , based on a TCT with estimated speed v = 20 kph. Tables
for other common TCT speeds are compiled in Appendix D.
Table 3.5 - Inter-sensor Distance (meters)




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
2 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
3 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
4 1333 667 444 333 267 222 190 167 148
5 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185
6 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
7 2333 1167 778 583 467 389 333 292 259
8 2667 1333 889 667 533 444 381 333 296
9 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
10 3333 1667 1111 833 667 556 476 417 370
Table 3.5 is based on Equation (3.4) which gives inter-sensor distance in meters as




60 (n - 1)
It is important to note that the number of sensors in the array for the look-up tables and
for Equation (3.4) represent only the sensors not making simultaneous reports. In the
case where w sensors report to the theater commander virtually simultaneously, only one
of the w is used in computing the array size. This is described further in the following
section.
D. ARRAY PLACEMENT PATTERNS
The final part of this chapter covers the actual geometry of the sensor array as
viewed from above. Each of the four proposed patterns has strengths and weaknesses
27
when evaluated in the areas of reporting time, compromise and countermeasures as
described below.
First, reporting time refers to the speed, in minutes, at which the entire array can
deliver n reports to the theater commander. Next, compromise is the probability that
additional array sensors are found given that one has been discovered. Finally,
countermeasures refers to the likelihood that more than one sensor may be affected if
some form ofjamming is used in its proximity. Also included in this category are
environmental effects which may hamper sensor performance, such as wind gusts or a
falling branch.
When seeding a road, sensors spaced equidistant from each other fall into four
proposed patterns: the line, the cross-hatch, triples, and the goal post. These are
summarized and illustrated in Figures 3.3 through 3.6, below. For each figure, d
represents the inter-sensor spacing and ds the off-road distance. Larger arrays than those
shown can be built by adding two of the above simple pattern units, or by continuing the
obvious pattern.
i& d d 41* 9
ds
% r> 1
Figure 3.3 - Line Pattern
The line pattern is the simplest of the building blocks used for array placement.
Sensors are placed on one side of the road with a constant inter-sensor distance, ^meters,
and an off-road distance, ds meters. This pattern is also the easiest to lay, either by hand




Figure 3.4 - Cross-Hatch Pattern
The cross-hatch pattern alternates sensors on either side of the road, again with an
effective along-road spacing oid. This pattern would be extremely difficult to deploy
from the air. If it became necessary to do so, the aircraft would have to fly along either
side of the road on separate runs, spacing the sensors a distance of 2d meters apart.
Again, it would be unlikely that the configuration between the two rows would be
properly aligned with this technique. With this in mind, it is recommended that this








Figure 3.5 - Triples Pattern
The triples pattern combines the line and the cross-hatch patterns. In fact, this pattern
could also be produced with quadruples, or more. Similar deployment problems as with
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the cross-hatch are evident here, also. An advantage of the triples pattern is that every 2d
meters ofTCT transit there is a simultaneous report from two sensors.
Figure 3.6 - Goal Post Pattern
Finally, the goal post pattern is a combination oftwo line patterns, one on either
side of the road. It can easily be deployed by both land and air forces. The greatest
advantage of the goal post, is that the theater commander receives two sensor reports
virtually simultaneously every d meters. The weakness is that any environmental effects or
countermeasures affecting one sensor will probably also negate its counterpart across the
road.
The performance of each of the patterns described above is scored on a scale of
one to four and their relationships are illustrated on a policy diagram. In each case, a
higher score is desired. Operationally, scores are obtained from the tactical experience of
the theater commander. As an example, the author has provided scores for the overall
performance of the sensor patterns when evaluated for reporting speed, likelihood of
compromise, and susceptibility to countermeasures or environmental factors. These
values are summarized in Table 3.6.
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w, = 1/3 Vi
Line 1 1 3 1.67
Cross-hatch 1 4 4 3.00
Triples 3 3 2 2.67
Goal Post 4 2 1 2.33
The triples and goal post patterns score high in the reporting category because two
sensors relay information virtually simultaneously at most every 2d meters. This
significantly speeds up the reporting time of the array. On the other hand, this
arrangement could lead to greater susceptibility to countermeasures or compromise, and
so they score lower in this attribute. The cross-hatch pattern scores high against both
countermeasures and compromise because the inter-sensor distance on one side of the
road is Id, or twice the actual inter-sensor distance. However, a report is only received
every d/v time units rather than 2 reports every d/v time units, and therefore a lower
reporting score.
The last column represents the relative values of the patterns if all three attributes
are equally weighted, an unlikely occurrence for any decision maker. Therefore, a
sensitivity analysis of the weights was performed using the ranks in Table 3.6. The policy
space of the relative weights of the different categories is shown in Figure 3.7
31




Figure 3.7 - Placement Preference Regions
where W\ and w2 represent the relative weights associated with reporting time and
compromise. The sum of the weights on reporting time, compromise, and
countermeasures is equal to one, or
The absence of the line pattern altogether is due to its domination by the cross-
hatch pattern in the feasible region. For theater commanders who weigh reporting time
heavily, cross-hatch is the pattern of choice in most cases. On the other hand, if
compromise is paramount and reporting time of little value, then triples should be chosen.
If all attributes are equally weighted, then the diagram indicates cross-hatch should be
chosen as was indicated in Table 3.6.
E. CONCLUSIONS
This section is best summarized by returning to Figure 2.6, reprinted below as
Figure 3.8. This flow diagram may be used as a checklist for the theater commander when
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Figure 3.8 - Array Deployment Checklist
The inputs include the array stockpile size, the candidate array sites, vehicle flow rates,
and corresponding TCT population fractions for those sites. From the nonlinear program
specified in Section B an optimal array size and k,* are obtained. Next, the theater
commander must decide on his maximum array reporting time and estimated TCT velocity
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along the seeded road. These estimates, along with the array size above will yield the
recommended inter-sensor distance when applied to Equation (3.4). With reasonable
estimates of enemy capability, the probability of compromise may also be obtained at this
point using Equation (3.3). Finally, the decision maker must prioritize the relative weights
of reporting time, compromise, and countermeasures. These weights, when applied to
Figure 3.7, return the optimal array pattern. Therefore, the complicated task of choosing
the optimal array for a given set of roads in a theater of operations has been reduced to




This chapter addresses the specific location of the array along a chosen road to
maximize the array's strengths and minimize the chance of compromise in accordance
with the theater commander's mission priorities. It is assumed that the intelligence
community is responsible for choosing the particular roads to be seeded based on TCT
traffic, mission criticality, and probability of mission success. The specific areas of
placement considered are straight road segments, intersections, and geographic choke
points. Each is described, then evaluated by sensitivity analysis to determine which best
suits the theater commander's assessment of the tactical picture.
B. GENERAL PLACEMENT CONCERNS
Before the different possible locations are measured against one another, it is first
necessary to determine the attributes most important to mission success. These attributes,
placement and compromise, information, and tactical potential, are then used to evaluate
the relative strength of each location. The performance of arrays in each of the possible
locations described below is scored on a scale of one to four and their relationships are
illustrated in a policy diagram. In each case, a higher score is desired.
Placement involves the ease with which the array may be deployed by SOF or by
air. Placement not only includes the physical difficulty in laying the sensors, but also the
likelihood that the insertion team is discovered before the array is completely deployed and
camouflaged. Placement is grouped with compromise because they share the same
strengths and weaknesses, thereby making their scores equal and uninteresting. That said,
compromise, unlike the array spacing analysis, addresses the probability that the first
sensor of an array is discovered by random sweeps conducted by hostile forces. This is
based on the assumption that the opponent knows the United States is using ground
sensors for cueing strike assets, and is sweeping areas deemed most likely to be harboring
arrays. Information is obtained from the raw data produced by the array. This includes
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both positive and negative information, which are defined as the presence of a TCT, and
the lack ofTCT contact, respectively. The tactical potential score is based on the clarity
of the information received by the theater commander from the array. Specifically, the
information attribute addresses the ability to transfer data to an airborne strike asset.
Locations which allow an airborne platform to easily locate and positively correlate a
vehicle with the array output are high on the scoring scale. Those that provide confusing
or ambiguous information score low. The three attributes are weighted in relative
importance by the theater commander and the optimal array location is read from the
policy graph later in this chapter.
C. STRAIGHT ROAD SEGMENT
Locating an array along a straight road segment is probably the simplest, and most
practical insertion technique. Since straight roads are far more abundant than choke
points or intersections, it is a simple matter for a trained unit to choose an easily accessible
section of road, deploy the array and withdraw. Similarly, air-dropped arrays are equally
effective along any section of a straight road, and the exact location may be chosen to
minimize the possibility of action by hostile forces, both against the array and the
deploying aircraft. Because road segments are so abundant, forces sweeping for arrays
will have little success. It would be a difficult task, without some kind of cueing to isolate
a particular section of straight road along which to conduct a search for an array. For this
reason, it is hypothesized that enemy search forces will concentrate on sweeping choke
points and intersections rather than on open roads. The geometry of road segments
precludes excessive traffic, and the specific volume of traffic is a function of the road
chosen, not the segment. Finally, road segments provide a clear tactical picture in that
there is only one entry and one egress from a road segment. Therefore, a cued air asset
should easily locate and visually identify a TCT traveling down a straight road. The scores
for the straight road segment for the above attributes are shown in Table 4. 1
.
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These scores are used in the sensitivity analysis against the other array locations.
D. INTERSECTION
Intersections naturally attract significant attention due to the seemingly endless
possibilities they provide. A TCT is easily tracked until it reaches an intersection. Then,
unless each of the exiting segments contains an array, it could simply vanish from the
tactical picture of the theater commander. Similarly, iftwo arrays on opposite sides of an
intersection gain contact in a reasonable time increment, who can positively state that
there is only one TCT operating in the area? Perhaps the original TCT turned, and a
second unit is passing the other sensor. These problems plague road intersections and
may not be easily answered. The only definite solution is the use of a SOF team at the
intersection to visually identify each TCT as it passes.
The general business of an intersection automatically makes array placement by
SOF team more difficult. Although not all intersections are busy, they are by nature more
traveled than straight road segments. Following the above hypothesis that enemy
sweeping action will be concentrated at intersections and choke points, makes arrays
placed at intersections more subject to compromise. Further, the likelihood that a given
intersection is searched grows with the relative importance of that intersection as a
military transit hub. Obviously, intersections near to forward assembly areas will be swept
regularly. The real strength of intersections is the volume of information they produce.
The sheer amount of traffic flowing through a busy intersection provides an excellent
sample of vehicle population of all types, TCT and otherwise. A seeded intersection with
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no TCT contact provides as much, if not more, information as a positive contact along a
straight road. The negative information associated with the intersection implies not only
that the intersection sees no TCT traffic, but also that the road segments adjacent are not
used by TCT's. This can significantly reduce the overall search area for other assets and
can help determine array locations for future array deployment sites. Tactically an
intersection provides little aid in the prosecution ofTCT's by air assets. A TCT passing
through an intersection is generally lost until it passes a more specific identification point,
such as a choke point or an array along a straight road segment. Array output is generally
too vague to determine which branch the TCT took when exiting the intersection. Table
4.2 lists the scores for an intersection as a placement location.










E. GEOGRAPHIC CHOKE POINT
Geographic choke points share the best and the worst characteristics of the above
two locations. Placement is difficult due to the very nature of the choke point. Entry and
egress to the area may be difficult, and it may be well patrolled because of its significance.
Additionally, since the opposing forces must also realize this area is a choke point, it is a
very likely candidate for sweeps, making the risk of compromise greater. With less area to
search, arrays in these areas are at high risk. Depending on the particular choke point,
information provided may be quite plentiful. If the area is one of few allowing passage
between hostile depots and their forward staging areas, much information will be available.
Similarly, a bridge or causeway frequently used to move military vehicles is a good target.
38
Finally, the tactical use of a geographic choke point is incomparable. A targets moving
into a choke point is restricted in movement and may be waited for as it egresses. This
would allow an easy transition from ground information to air. The attribute scores for
the geographic choke points are given in Table 4.3.











A summary of the overall value of the different location areas when evaluated for
placement and compromise, information, and tactical potential is given in Table 4.4. The
last column indicates the value of the location areas with all attributes weighted equally.
Note that each area totals to a value of two. This implies that each of the areas has
strengths and weaknesses in the attributes evaluated, and that the most suitable location
depends greatly on the preferences of the theater commander.










w, = 1/3 Vi
Straight Road 1 2 3 2
Intersection 3 1 2 2
Choke Point 2 3 1 2
The policy space of the relative weights of the different categories is shown in Figure 4.1,
where W\ and w2 represent the relative weights associated with information and tactical
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potential. The sum of the weights on information, tactical potential, and placement and
3
compromise is equal to one, or ^w, = 1
.
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Figure 4.1 - Placement Location Preference Regions
For example, the intelligence analyst, who is most concerned with information
flow, may consider the information attribute paramount while having little concern for the
tactical potential of the array. In his case, the array is best located at an intersection. On
the other hand, the strike pilot is only interested in his ability to localize a target identified
by the array. His choice would be for the choke point. The final extreme is represented
by the SOF planner concerned with providing useful information without compromising
the insertion team. His policy of choice would be the straight road. The diagram also
provides a representation of the case illustrated in Table 4.4. This decision maker, who
weighs all attributes equally, draws no information from the policy diagram.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Used effectively, unattended ground sensors are a significant asset in the theater
commander's TBMD toolbox. The key to accomplishing the optimal use of this resource,
and those that rely upon it, is a step by step plan to follow for their employment. This
thesis provides the checklist to be used by theater commanders to maximize ballistic
missile defense at minimal cost.
A. THE PROCESS
The process begins with a specific theater with an overlying road grid. The theater
commander is allotted N unattended ground sensors to be deployed at his discretion. The
intelligence shop, after careful analysis selects A candidate array sites based on time critical
target traffic and mission criticality. Provided with the list of sites is a corresponding Px,
the fraction of vehicular traffic along that segment believed to be time critical, and Xu the
estimated vehicle flow rate.
The theater commander then enlists a member of his staff to run the optimization
given in Chapter III, Section B to minimize his expected losses based on the above
parameters. The nonlinear program produces an optimal array size, w* and prosecution
policy, k*, for each of the A sites. If nonlinear programming software is unavailable,
Appendix B may be used in which the maximum allowable probability of a leaker is
compared to that of a false alarm to obtain an n*. Appendix C then provides the optimal
policy on prosecution using the array sizes specified in Appendix B. These look up tables
are generated by enumerating the possible combinations ofn and k, then choosing that
which produces the minimal loss by Equation (3.2). It is important to note that the look
up table procedure may not provide the actual optimal solution for the case whereN is
limited. The look up tables merely supply the optimal array size for discrete roads,
without limiting the total count of sensors deployed.
With the array sizes and policies determined, the next step is to find the inter-
sensor spacing to be used given that it is desirous to minimize the reporting time between
adjacent sensors and also minimize the likelihood that the entire array is compromised by
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hostile forces. Appendix D provides look up tables for sensor distance based on array
size, estimated TCT speed, and the maximum reporting time for the array. When entering
the look up tables, it is important to subtract one for each pair of sensors that report
virtually simultaneously because of their pattern orientation, as described in Chapter III
Section D.
The geometry of the pattern is devised through the theater commander's relative
weight of reporting time, compromise, and susceptibility to counter-measures. These
weights are applied to Figure 3.7 and the optimal deployment pattern is read from the
graph. To maximize the array effectiveness according to this theater commander's
desires, sensors should be placed in the appropriate pattern with the spacing determined
above.
After the specifics of the A arrays are complete, it is time to begin mission
planning. The theater commander must meet with his intelligence analysts and
operational planners to determine the relative weights of the factors affecting array
locations, placement and compromise, information, and tactical potential. These weights
are then applied to Figure 4.1 to ascertain the type of location most beneficial to the
overall effort, yet in an area conducive to array deployment. These locations are broken
into the categories of choke points, straight roads, and intersections.
B. SUMMARY
As budgets continue to shrink and small theater actions become more common,
optimal use of available assets exponentially increases in importance. The Vietnam era
tradition of attrition warfare has given way to today's cost effective battlefield upon which
fewer soldiers, and a large number of less expensive sensors are placed. This is the
essence of Libicki's technological "Mesh" in which many small sensors perform all the
data collection with the added advantage of being too numerous to kill, and thereby more
robust. In fact, the role ofunattended ground sensors can be summed up in that
being there is necessarily a prerequisite to seeing there, and not necessarily a
prerequisite to hitting there if the range set of one's own weapons is sufficiently
dense.
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Judiciously placed sensors, combined with lethal UAV's, artillery, or theater missiles
would go a long way toward this vision. This document begins to satisfy the first portion
of that equation.
Theater ballistic missiles pose an ominous threat to any theater commander in the
battlefields of the future. It is only through the judicious use of all available assets that
decisive action may be taken. Properly employed unattended ground sensors provide a
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APPENDIX A. THE "STEEL RATTLER" SENSOR
As an excellent example of the advances in sensor technology, "Steel Rattler"
unattended ground sensors are used as the basis for the analyses in this thesis. The
capabilities of both the sensor units and their deployment systems continue to evolve, but
this appendix serves as a current-day ability profile. The sensors were designed and tested
by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from which most of this
information was obtained. Further data was provided by Central MASINT Technology of
Florida.
The "Steel Rattler" is a multi-component unattended ground sensor system with
seismic, acoustic and infrared detection and identification capability. The seismic/ acoustic
array first detects a target of interest and attempts to match its signature with a pre-loaded
signature database. The time of detection, array position, and identification are sent via
satellite link to a fusion center. If a positive identification is not possible, the seismic/
acoustic array "wakes up" the infrared sensor which is positioned further along the
expected route of travel. The infrared sensor transmits a still photograph of the target of
interest at its closest point of approach to the fusion center via a satellite link where a
system operator must visually identify the contact. If the seismic/ acoustic array makes an
identification, the infrared sensor will never be activated. There is no ability to turn on the
infrared to confirm the sensor's identification. Similarly, if the seismic/ acoustic array fails
to detect a target of interest, the infrared sensor has no means to detect on its own. It is
possible to position a seismic/ acoustic array on either side of the infrared sensor to detect
targets moving in either direction.
The seismic/ acoustic array field of regard is 360°. Therefore, the search area for
the seismic/ acoustic array is circular with a radius equal to the maximum seismic/ acoustic
range centered at the array position. This maximum range is approximately 500 meters,
depending on the specific terrain in which the array is placed. For the purpose of this
analysis, all sensors are assumed to be "cookie-cutter," implying that there is no chance of
detecting a target outside the specified maximum range. In reality, some detections may
occur in this region.
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The "Steel Rattler" can be described as a system performing spot searches on a
recurring basis. The actual sensor sample rate is once per second, but a maximum of five
seconds are required to report a detection to the fusion center. For this reason, a five
second sample rate is used in the model analysis of Chapter III. The time required to
check a target signature against the database is less than one second, and therefore
considered negligible for this thesis. [Ref. 7]
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APPENDIX B. SIZE LOOK-UP TABLES
The tables in this appendix are based on the k* or more ofn* policy given in
Chapter II and the derivation in Appendix F. They are subdivided by the relative values of
a leaker versus a false alarm, given as r x and r2 respectively. Each table has a
corresponding PK value which is the fraction of traffic assumed to be TCTs. The sensors
are assumed identical with/i = 0.80 and/ = 0.15, as previously described. The table is
entered with a row value of the maximum allowable probability of prosecuting a non-TCT,
and a column value of the maximum allowable probability of a leaker.
Table entries are obtained by enumerating possible values ofn for the appropriate
probabilities of a leaker and of a false alarm, and choosing the minimum array size. To
summarize this procedure, let k(n) be the optimal policy which minimizes l{n,k). Further,
let
a(n, k) be the probability of a leaker, /'(Leaker), and
P(n, k) be the probability of prosecuting a non-TCT, P(Hit F.T.).
The optimal array size may then be obtained from the math program given by
Minimize n
s.t.





For Example, assume leakers and false alarms have relative values ofr\ = 1 and r2
= 1 , respectively. Now assume that the theater commander wants to know the optimal
array size given that he will allow a 5% leaker probability and a 20% chance of
prosecuting a non-TCT. The intelligence shop estimates that 20% of vehicle traffic are
TCT's. Then, from the PK = 0.4 Table in Section B, the optimal array size is n* = 3.
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A. "Leaker," rx = 1 and "False alarm," r2 = 1
P. = 0.1
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 6 3















0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01
Max 0.05




7 4 4 4 1 1
7 3 2 2 1 1
7 3 2 2 1 1
7 3 2 2 1 1
7 3 2 2 1 1
7 3 2 2 1 1
P, = 0.3
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 9 6 4 4 4 4
Max 0.05 8 3 3 2 2 2
P(Hit F.T.) 0.10 8 3 3 2 2 2
0.15 8 3 1 1 1 1
0.20 8 3 1 1 1 1
0.25 8 3 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.4
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 9 7 7 7 7 7
Max 0.05 6 3 2 2 2 ' 2
P(Hit F.T.) 0.10 6 3 1 . 1 1 1
0.15 6 3 1 1 1 1
0.20 6 3 1 1 1 1
0.25 6 3 1 1 1 1
50
P x = 0.5
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 9 7 7 7 7 7
Max 0.05 6 5 3 3 3 3
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 6 4 1 1 1 1
0.15 6 2 1 1 1 1
0.20 6 2 1 1 1 1
0.25 6 2 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.6
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 7 7 7 7 7
Max 0.05 8 4
.
3 3 3 3
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 8 4 3 1 1 1
0.15 8 2 2 1 1 1
0.20 8 2 2 1 1 1
0.25 8 2 2 1 1 1
P x = 0.7
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 5 5 5 5 5
Max 0.05 7 4 3 1
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 7 2 2 1
0.15 7 2 2 1
0.20 7 2 2 1
0.25 7 2 2 1
P x = 0.8
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 6 6 6 6 6
Max 0.05 5 4 4 4
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 3 2 2 2
0.15 3 2 2 2
0.20 3 2 2 2
0.25 3 2 2 2
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P x = 0.9
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 7 6 6 6 6 6
Max 0.05 3 2 2 2 2 2
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.15 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.20 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1
B. "Leaker," n = 2 and "False alarm," r2 = 1
P x =0.1
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 6 6 6 6 6 6
Max 0.05 5 2 2 2 2 2
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 5 2 2 2 2 2
0.15 5 1 1 1 1 1
0.20 5 1 1 1 1 1
0.25 5 1 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.2
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 7 4 4 4 4 4
Max 0.05 7 3 2 2 2 2
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 7 3 2 2 2 2
0.15 7 1 1 1 1 1
0.20 7 1 1 1 1 1
0.25 7 1 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.3
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 9 7 7 7 7 7
Max 0.05 6 3 3 3 3 3
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 4 3 3 3 3 3
0.15 4 3 1 1 1 1
0.20 4 2 1 1 1 1





0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 9 7 7 7 7 7
Max 0.05 6 3 3 3 3 3
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 6 3 1 1 1 1
0.15 6 3 1 1 1 1
0.20 6 2 1 1 1 1
0.25 6 2 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.5
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 10 7 7 7 7 7
Max 0.05 6 5 3 3 3 3
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 6 4 1 1 1 1
0.15 6 2 1 1 1 1
0.20 6 2 1 1 1 1
0.25 6 2 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.6
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 8 8 8 8 8
Max 0.05 7 6 3 3 3 3
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 5 4 3 1 1 1
0.15 5 2 2 1 1 1
0.20 5 2 2 1 1 1
0.25 5 2 2 1 1 1
P x = 0.7
0.01 0.05
Max P (Leaker)
















P x = 0.8
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 6 6 6 6 6
Max 0.05 5 4 4 4 4 4
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 3 2 2 2 2 2
0.15 3 2 2 2 2 2
0.20 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.9
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 7 7 7 7 7 7
Max 0.05 3 2 2 2 2 2
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 1 1 1 • 1 1 1
0.15 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.20 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1
C. "Leaker," n = 1 and "False alarm," r2 = 2
P x =0.1
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 6 3













P x = 0.2
Max P (Leaker)







7 4 3 3 1 1
7 4 2 2 1 1
7 4 2 2 1 1
7 4 2 2 1 1
7 4 2 2 1 1














P x = 0.4
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 9 6 4 4 4 4
Max 0.05 9 3 3 2 2 2
P(Hlt FT.) 0.10 9 3 1 1 1 1
0.15 9 3 1 1 1 1
0.20 9 3 1 1 1 1
0.25 9 3 1 1 1 1
P, = 0.5
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 9 6 4 4 4 4
Max 0.05 8 5 3 3 2 2
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 8 5 1 1 1 1
0.15 8 5 1 1 1 1
0.20 8 5 1 1 1 1
0.25 8 5 1 1 1 1
P x = 0.6
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 7 7 7 7 2
Max 0.05 8 4 3 3 3 2
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 8 4 3 1 1 1
0.15 8 4 3 1 1 1
0.20 8 4 3 1 1 1
0.25 8 4 3 1 1 1
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P x = 0.7
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 5 5 5 5 5
Max 0.05 8 4 3 1
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 8 2 2 1
0.15 8 2 2 1
0.20 8 2 2 1
0.25 8 2 2 1
P x = 0.8
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 8 5 5 5 5 5
Max 0.05 8 4 3 3
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 8 2 2 2
0.15 8 2 2 2
0.20 8 2 2 2
0.25 8 2 2 2
P x = 0.9
Max P (Leaker)
0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.01 6 6 6 6 6 6
Max 0.05 3 2 2 2 2 2
P(Hit FT.) 0.10 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.15 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.20 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1
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APPENDIX C. POLICY LOOK-UP TABLES
The tables in this appendix give the optimal k* of the "£ or more of a?" policy
described in Chapter II. They are subdivided by the relative values of a leaker versus a
false alarm, given as r\ and r2 respectively. Each table has a corresponding Px value which
is the local fraction of traffic assumed to be TCT. The sensors are assumed identical with
// = 0.80 andfo = 0.15. Table values are obtained by fixing Px and n, then enumerating
values of the loss function (Equation (3.2)) for varying k. The k corresponding to the
minimum loss function value isk*.
For Example, assume leakers and false alarms have relative values of r\ = 1 and r2
= 2, respectively. Now assume that the theater commander wants to know the optimal k
or more of n* policy given an array size ofn = 8 sensors. The intelligence shop estimates
that 40% of vehicle traffic are TCT's. Then, from the Px = 0.4 column in Section B, the
optimal value ofk is k* = 4. That is, the contact at the sensor should be prosecuted as a
TCT if four or more of the eight sensors indicate that it is a TCT.
A. Leaker," ri = 1 and "False alarm," r2 = 1
Px = 0.10 Px = 0.20 Px =0.30
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 2 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 3
5 4 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 4
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 5 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 6 10 6 10 5
57
Px = 0.40 Px = 0.50 PX = 0.60
n k* n If* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 2 4 2 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 3
6 3 6 3 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 5 10 5 10 5
Px = 0.70 Px = 0.80 Px = 0.90
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 2 3 1 3 1
4 2 4 2 4 2
5 3 5 2 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 3
7 3 7 3 7 3
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 4 9 4 9 4
10 5 10 5 10 4
B. "Leaker," r, = 2 and "False alarm," r2 = 1
Px =0.10 Px = 0.20 Px =0.30
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 6 10 5 10 5
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Px = 0.40 Px = 0.50 Px = 0.60
n k* n If* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 2 4 2 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 3
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 4 9 4
10 5 10 5 10 5
Px = 0.70 Px = 0.80 Px = 0.90
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 1 3 1 3 1
4 2 4 2 4 1
5 2 5 2 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 2
7 3 7 3 7 2
8 4 8 4 8 3
9 4 9 4 9 3
10 5 10 4 10 4
C. "Leaker," ri = 1 and "False alarm," r2 = 2
Px =0.10 Px = 0.20 Px = 0.30
n k* n k* n **
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 3
5 4 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 4
7 5 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 5 8 5
9 6 9 5 9 5
10 6 10 6 10 6
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Px = 0.40 Px = 0.50 Px = 0.60
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 5 10 5 10 5
Px =0.70 Px = 0.80 Px = 0.90
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 1
4 2 4 2 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 3
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 4 9 4
10 5 10 5 10 5
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APPENDIX D. SPACING LOOK-UP TABLES
The tables in this appendix give the inter-sensor distance for array sensors as
described in Chapter III. Most of the factors affecting sensor spacing are beyond the
control of the theater commander, so these values are based on some simple assumptions.
It is important to note that the number of sensors in the array for the look-up represent
only the sensors not making simultaneous reports. In the case where w sensors report to
the theater commander virtually simultaneously, only one of the w is used in computing the
array size. Table values are obtained from Equation (3.4) with the assumption that TCT
velocity is constant through the array. A separate table is provided for speeds varying
from 5 to 55 kph, and for one to ten sensor array sizes.
For Example, assume that the theater commander wants to know the optimal inter-
sensor distance given his array size ofn = 8 sensors. The intelligence shop estimates that
TCT's along this stretch of road travel at approximately v = 30 kph and the theater
commander wants his full array to report in no more than tR = 6 minutes. Then, from the
"Speed v = 30 kph" table, reading then = 8 column and the tR = 6 minutes yields a
maximum sensor spacing ofd = 375 meters.




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 83 42 28 21 17 14 12 10 9
2 167 83 56 42 33 28 24 21 19
3 250 125 83 63 50 42 36 31 28
4 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
5 417 208 139 104 83 69 60 52 46
6 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
7 583 292 194 146 117 97 83 73 65
8 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
9 750 375 250 188 150 125 107 94 83
10 833 417 278 208 167 139 119 104 93
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Distance for TCT Speed v = 10 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 167 83 56 42 33 28 24 21 19
2 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
3 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
4 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
5 833 417 278 208 167 139 119 104 93
6 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
7 1167 583 389 292 233 194 167 146 130
8 1333 667 444 333 267 222 190 167 148
9 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
10 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 250 125 83 63 50 42 36 31 28
2 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
3 750 375 250 188 150 125 107 94 83
4 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
5 1250 625 417 313 250 208 179 156 139
6 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
7 1750 875 583 438 350 292 250 219 194
8 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
9 2250 1125 750 563 450 375 321 281 250
10 2500 1250 833 625 500 417 357 313 278




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
2 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
3 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
4 1333 667 444 333 267 222 190 167 148
5 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185
6 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
7 2333 1167 778 583 467 389 333 292 259
8 2667 1333 889 667 533 444 381 333 296
9 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
10 3333 1667 1111 833 667 556 476 417 370
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Distance for TCT Speed v = 25 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 417 208 139 104 83 69 60 52 46
2 833 417 278 208 167 139 119 104 93
3 1250 625 417 313 250 208 179 156 139
4 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185
5 2083 1042 694 521 417 347 298 260 231
6 2500 1250 833 625 500 417 357 313 278
7 2917 1458 972 729 583 486 417 365 324
8 3333 1667 1111 833 667 556 476 417 370
9 3750 1875 1250 938 750 625 536 469 417
10 4167 2083 1389 1042 833 694 595 521 463
]Distance for TCT Speed v = 30 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
2 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
3 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
4 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
5 2500 1250 833 625 500 417 357 313 278
6 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
7 3500 1750 1167 875 700 583 500 438 389
8 4000 2000 1333 1000 800 667 571 500 444
9 4500 2250 1500 1125 900 750 643 563 500
10 5000 2500 1667 1250 1000 833 714 625 556
Distance for TCT Speed v = 35 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 583 292 194 146 117 97 83 73 65
2 1167 583 389 292 233 194 167 146 130
3 1750 875 583 438 350 292 250 219 194
4 2333 1167 778 583 467 389 333 292 259
5 2917 1458 972 729 583 486 417 365 324
6 3500 1750 1167 875 700 583 500 438 389
7 4083 2042 1361 1021 817 681 583 510 454
8 4667 2333 1556 1167 933 778 667 583 519
9 5250 2625 1750 1313 1050 875 750 656 583
10 5833 2917 1944 1458 1167 972 833 729 648
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Distance for TCT Speed v = 45 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 750 375 250 188 150 125 107 94 83
2 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
3 2250 1125 750 563 450 375 321 281 250
4 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
5 3750 1875 1250 938 750 625 536 469 417
6 4500 2250 1500 1125 900 750 643 563 500
7 5250 2625 1750 1313 1050 875 750 656 583
8 6000 3000 2000 1500 1200 1000 857 750 667
9 6750 3375 2250 1688 1350 1125 964 844 750
10 7500 3750 2500 1875 1500 1250 1071 938 833
Distance for TCT Speed v = 55 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 917 458 306 229 183 153 131 115 102
2 1833 917 611 458 367 306 262 229 204
3 2750 1375 917 688 550 458 393 344 306
4 3667 1833 1222 917 733 611 524 458 407
5 4583 2292 1528 1146 917 764 655 573 509
6 5500 2750 1833 1375 1100 917 786 688 611
7 6417 3208 2139 1604 1283 1069 917 802 713
8 7333 3667 2444 1833 1467 1222 1048 917 815
9 8250 4125 2750 2063 1650 1375 1179 1031 917
10 9167 4583 3056 2292 1833 1528 1310 1146 1019
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APPENDIX E. PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION
Chapter II introduces the probability of identification calculations used within the
models. These probabilities are based on conditional probability and derived from both
Bayes' Rule and the Law of Total Probability. This appendix shows the derivation of the
exactly k ofn (Equation [2.3]) and the k or more ofn (Equation [2.4]) computations.
A. SINGLE SENSOR ARRAY
The simplest case is an array consisting of a single sensor placed along a road. For
the purposes of this analysis, it will still be considered an "array," and in fact will be the
basic building block of all larger arrays. This array, as with all the arrays to be discussed,
provides decision probabilities, P(TCT | //l), based on the sensor output and the fraction
of vehicle traffic assumed to be TCT. P(TCT | 1/1) is defined as the probability that the
target is a TCT given the sensor reports it as TCT. Similarly, P(TCT | 0/1) is the
probability that the target is TCT given the sensor reports it as non-TCT . In all cases, Px,
the fraction of vehicles assumed to be TCT, must be provided by some intelligence
estimate. [Ref 4]
Let
\ 1 if the target moving past the sensor is a TCT,
X = \
{ otherwise.
Each sensor outputs a forecast denoted by:
f 1 if the sensor identifies the target as TCT,
F, = \
[ otherwise.
Additional sensors are denoted using increasing subscripts, i.e. /=/, 2, 3, ....
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From sensor performance data provided by the manufacturer and field tests, the
forecast likelihoods are given by
/i = P{ Sensor indicates a TCT given a TCT present}, and
/o = P{ Sensor indicates a TCT given no TCT present).
That is,
/1 =p{F = lj^ = l},and
/ =P{F = 1\X = 0}.
For the simple one sensor case, using the forecast probabilities and Bayes' Rule,






B. TWO SENSOR ARRAY
The two sensor array consists oftwo sensors spaced close enough to assume both
identification calls reported to the fusion center are on the same target. The theater
commander will be provided with the decision probabilities, P(TCT | k/n). As before, the
estimate, Px , must be provided by intelligence.
Each of the two sensors will output a forecast denoted by
\ 1 if sensor 1 identifies the target as TCT,
Ft = i
[ otherwise.
[ 1 if sensor 2 identifies the target as TCT,
F2 = {
{ otherwise.
If the sensors are assumed to be conditionally independent, then
/>[f, =iuF2 =i2 \X = x} = p{F, =i l \X = x}p{F2 =i2 \X = x), where/, xe{0, 1}.
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Also, since the sensors are identical, P(F\ =f\X=x) = P(F2 =f\X=x) for every/ and x.
Therefore/i (i)=/i (2) and/0( i) =/o(2 ). Henceforth,fx and
/
will be used for the forecast
likelihoods of all identical sensors.
The decision probabilities are given by [Ref. 4]








(1- f) 2 P
P(TCT\0/2) =
(1-/,) 2 JPX +(1-/ ) 2 (1- JPX )
C. GENERAL FORMALATION, n > 2



















where /„, x e {0,1 }. As above, the arrays are composed of identical sensors, and therefore
p{F
l
=]\X = \} = p{Fa =l\X = l} = fl ,aDd
p{f, =i\x = o} = p{f„ =\\x = o} = f .
Now, let k equal the number of sensors in an array of size n to identify a passing target as
a TCT. From Bayes' Rule and the Law of Total Probability the decision probabilities for
exactly k of n sensors indicating a TCT are given by
f
k(\-fV P
P(TCT|A / „) =— " iX 7 "-—r r
This equation can be used for any array size with a given intelligence estimate of the TCT
population.
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D. FINDING k OR MORE OF n POLICY
Again assume that an array ofn identical sensors is in place with forecast







APPENDIX F. k OR MORE OF n AND LOSS FUNCTION
COMPUTATIONS
The "at least k-out-of-n" policy of Chapter II and the loss function introduced in
Chapter III are the driving forces behind the two models used in this thesis. Their roots
are based in decision theory and conditional probability. This appendix shows a complete
derivation of the k or more ofn policy, and how it is used to generate the loss function,
l{n,k), of the optimization.
The decision required in this thesis is to choose an integer k, where 0<k<n, such
that the theater commander will take action if and only if at least k sensors indicate a
vehicle is a TCT. Recall that r\ is the loss obtained if no action is taken and the vehicle is
a TCT, and r2 is the loss obtained if a non-TCT is acted against. The expected loss is
l(n,k)= r] (p{X = \,S = 0} + P{X = \,S = \} + ...+P{X = \,S = k-\}) +
r2 (p{X = 0,5 = k) + P{X = 0,S = k + \} + ...+P{X = 0,S = /?})












+ r2 (\-B(k-l,n,f )(l-Px ))
where B\k
t




Figure F. 1 shows a Microsoft Excel v7.0 spreadsheet programmed to perform the






0.2 = 1 - f1










k D:Act D: Not Act Policy D:Act D: Not Act Policy L* P(r1) P(r2)
1 0.3404 0.3000 'NT 0.1969 0.0000 'N' 0.3000 0.1500 0.0000
2 0.1197 0.3000 'A' 0.5096 0.0000 'N' 0.1197 0.0000 0.3404
3 0.0288 0.2999 'A' 0.7303 0.0001 'N' 0.0289 0.0000 0.1197
4 0.0048 0.2991 •A' 0.8212 0.0009 'N' 0.0057 0.0005 0.0288
5 0.0005 0.2941 'A' 0.8452 0.0059 'N' 0.0064 0.0029 0.0048
6 0.0000 0.2743 •A' 0.8495 0.0257 'N* 0.0257 0.0128 0.0005
7 0.0000 0.2215 A' 0.8500 0.0785 'N' 0.0785 0.0393 0.0000
8 0.0000 0.1309 A' 0.8500 0.1691 'N' 0.1691 0.0846 0.0000
9 0.0000 0.0403 A' 0.8500 0.2597 'N' 0.2597 0.1299 0.0000
Figure F.l - Microsoft Excel Program
The numerical values on the table, with the exception of the probability columns
represent the relative losses with the values of rlt r2, Px, n and k given. Columns two
through four represent the condition that k or more sensors indicate a TCT, while columns
five through seven represent the condition that fewer than k do so. Finally, columns nine
and ten are the probabilities that a "leaker" or a "false alarm" occur with the values given.
It is these values, combined with the losses in column eight that provide the data for the
look up tables in the earlier appendices.
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